Granite Rocks and the State\u27s Influence Over Federal Land Use by Leshy, John D. & University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Books, Reports, and Studies Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment 
1988 
Granite Rocks and the State's Influence Over Federal Land Use 
John D. Leshy 
University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/books_reports_studies 
 Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons, Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, 
and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons 
Citation Information 
John D. Leshy, Granite Rocks and the State's Influence Over Federal Land Use (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. 





JOHN D. LESHY, GRANITE ROCKS AND THE STATE’S INFLUENCE 
OVER FEDERAL LAND USE (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of 
Colo. Sch. of Law 1988). 
 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson 
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the 
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law 
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School. 
 
Granite Rocks and the State's Influence






This article is an abridged version of an article which appears
in volume 18 of Environmental Law. Its genesis was a presenta
tion given at a symposium sponsored by the Natural Resources Law
Center and held in Denver oh April 15, 1987.
Granite Rock and the States' Influence over Federal Land Use*
By John D. Leshy **
The Supreme Court's decision in California Coastal
Commission v. Granite Rock Company (107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987))
leaves unanswered many questions about the scope of state
regulatory authority over activities being conducted on federal
land. But it is a significant victory for advocates of state
power, for it allows the states to apply their own regulatory
permitting statutes independently of parallel federal regula
tions. Thus the states possess a significant bit of leverage, if
they choose to exercise it, in the delicate interplay between
state and federal policymaking for federal lands. This article
will identify and suggest answers to some of the questions that
remain in the wake of the decision, and will offer some sugges
tions about how both the states and the federal government might
constructively go about responding to it.
This article is an abridged version of an article which
appears in volume 18 of Environmental Law. Its genesis was a
presentation given at a symposium sponsored by the Natural
Resources Law Center and held in Denver on April 15, 1987.
it it
'Professor of Law, Arizona State University
1. Can a state order mining on public lands to cease pending
determination of its permit requirements?
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority does not address
this question, but the answer would almost have to be yes. The
Supreme Court's decision plainly gives a state the power to
enforce its environmental regulatory laws by requiring permits
from private entities conducting activities on federal land
within its jurisdiction. Being able to enforce the permit
requirement with an injunction, at least if the ordinary require
ments of injunctive relief were met, seems a nearly necessary
corollary of being able to require the permit in the first place.
This implicates the Ninth Circuit decision in Ventura County
v. Gulf Oil Corp. {601 F. 2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979)), which laid
considerable emphasis on the idea that enforcement of the local
permit requirement there would have halted the activity. This
point did not escape dissenting Justice Powell in Granite Rock,
for he decried, as the "most troubling feature" of the majority's
decision, that "if the Coastal Commission can require Granite
Rock to secure a permit before allowing mining operations to
proceed, it necessarily can forbid Granite Rock from conducting
these operations."
If the state can enforce its permit requirement by injunc
tive relief, its leverage over the mining operation is made more
concrete, because the burden of going forward in the courts has
been substantially lifted from the shoulders of the state.
Instead, the miner who wants to argue that stringent state
regulation has been preempted, but who also wants to proceed with
mining while the issue is litigated, will now be obliged either
to comply with the state requirements, or to seek a stay of their
enforcement from the courts.
2. What differentiates state environmental regulation from land
use planning?
Justice O'Connor's opinion assumed, without deciding, that
while environmental regulation is protected, land use planning is
preempted — a matter taken up in the next section. Justice
O'Connor appreciated the impossibility of drawing a bright line
between the two, and it is not easy to improve upon her explana
tion:
"Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses
for the land; environmental regulation, at its core,
does not mandate particular uses of the land but
requires only that, however land is used, damage
to the environment is kept within prescribed limits."
The slipperiness of the distinction offers a substantial
opportunity to state and local governments, especially those who
are willing to review and, if necessary, recharacterize their
regulatory processes to shade them toward environmental
regulation. This is not to suggest that the courts will be
fooled merely by labels. Most judges are familiar with preemption
cases; many judges have served in legislatures and understand the
political process well enough to penetrate fabrications. But
these cases almost inevitably involve a careful sifting of facts,
statutes and regulations, and, as Granite Rock itself demon
strates, how a state chooses to paint its regulatory objective
can make a substantial difference in the outcome.
But Justice O'Connor's definition of environmental regula
tion leaves somewhat open the hard case, where the state is not
seeking to mandate particular uses of the land, but where its
effort to mitigate environmental damage effectively controls, if
not how the land will be used, at least how it may not be used.
If, for example, the Coastal Commission were to require, as a
condition of Granite Rock's permit, that the company backfill
and reclaim its open pit after mining, the cost might be so
prohibitive as to forestall any mining in the first place. Is
that reclamation requirement better characterized as land use
planning or environmental regulation? This is the gray area
sketched out by Justice O'Connor, where "a state environmental
regulation [is] so severe that a particular land use would become
commercially impracticable."
3. How far can a state go in denying or imposing conditions
on its permit?
By itself a state permit gives the state only some proce
dural and timing leverage over activities on federal land. For
the permit requirement to have genuinely substantive influence
over how federal lands are managed, the state must have authority
both to condition the permit upon compliance with substantive
state controls over the mining operation and, possibly, to deny a
permit if there are no circumstances under which the operation
can proceed in compliance with state law.
Here too the Granite Rock majority avoided definitive
resolution of this issue because it was not necessary to do so in
the context of a threshold challenge to the state's permit
requirement. But Justice O'Connor did address the issue oblique
ly, in discussing whether the state regulation in question was
better characterized as a land use or an environmental regula
tion. This permitted her, in turn, to mention a couple of
different formulations of the appropriate inquiry to be followed
in passing on a state permit condition: First, whether the
state's environmental regulation was "reasonable," and second,
whether it was "so severe that a particular land use [became]
commercially impracticable."
In evaluating these suggestions, it may be useful to
separate two issues: First, how far the state can go in regu
lating before it is preempted by federal law; and second, how far
the state can go \n regulating before it unconstitutionally takes
whatever property right the miner possesses. The state courts,
addressing these issues in the context of the Mining Law, have
generally lumped them together, following some version of what
has been called the "regulatory/prohibitory distinction" — that
states have the power to regulate mining operations on federal
land, but not to prohibit them.
These courts are probably correct in meshing the two. From
the beginning, the Mining Law has contemplated a large role for
state and local governments, at the same time it has offered
private miners the possibility, if certain conditions are
satisfied, of acquiring property rights in federal land. Thus,
generally speaking, the federal interest for preemption analysis
would seem to be adequately protected so long as the state did
not regulate to the point of taking whatever property right the
miner may have under federal law.
While the "regulatory-prohibitory distinction" has a nice
ring to it, its application raises some important questions. One
is whether proscribing a state veto means only that the state may
not expressly prohibit mining or whether, instead, it prevents
the state from regulating so heavily that the mining operation is
effectively, though not expressly, prohibited. If it is the
former, then the test is not very helpful, because it merely
counsels a state to hide its prohibitory intent behind onerous
conditions attached to the permit to mine. But if it is the
latter, it founders on the shoals of the federal statute under
which Granite Rock is operating here — the Mining Law of 1872.
That law's test for the validity of a mining claim, by which
miners perfect valid property rights against the landowner United
States, is whether the mining claimant has made a "discovery" of
a "valuable mineral deposit." Establishing a discovery, a
multitude of reported decisions has made clear, turns substant
ially on whether a commercially viable mineral deposit has been
found. And that, as numerous decisions hold, is influenced by
the costs of extracting the deposit, including the cost of
complying with applicable regulatory requirements.
Almost any state (or federal, for that matter) regulation is
bound to increase a miner's cost of operations. If the regula
tion is onerous enough, the deposit may be rendered uneconomic to
mine. If so, the miner's legal "discovery," and her property
right, vanish, presumably without compensation. This possibility
has not seemed to trouble the Supreme Court in the past. It has
made clear, for example, that California could levy a tax on
Granite Rock's interest in its unpatented mining claims, which
would surely detract from the commercial viability of the
deposit.
Moreover, to say that a state (or federal government) may
regulate only to the extent it does not effectively prohibit
mining leads to an odd result. Because it would limit the
extensiveness of the regulation depending upon the economic
viability of the particular operation, it would tend to allow
regulation only of clearly profitable mining operations, and not
marginal ones. But the state's interest in mitigating environ
mental impacts is not likely to vary with the profit margins of
mining claimants. Indeed, it may often be true that economically
marginal mining operations are the most environmentally destruc
tive.
Like "takings" questions in general, this issue is likely to
escape definitive generic resolution. Indeed, the hazards of
applying the "regulatory-prohibitory distinction" might have
counseled the Gr anite Rock majority to avoid an explicit
endorsement of it, even to the point of neglecting to cite, much
less discuss, the state court decisions that have adopted it. In
the end, the agencies and the courts will probably muddle through
by assessing the "reasonableness" of the state's environmental
regulation. Perhaps we will even see employed in this context
the late twentieth century judiciary's favorite buzzword, a
"balancing" of the strength of the state's interest in mitigat
ing environmental impacts against the legitimacy of the miner's
expectation of a right to mine, leavened by whatever national
interest one might find in the matter.
4. Do the modern federal land use planning statutes preempt
independent application of state land use (as opposed to environ
mental) regulations?
This is another question left unresolved in Granite Rock,
because the majority characterized the Coastal Commission's
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regulations as "environmental" rather than "land use." Yet it
did broach the topic, and assumed without deciding the issue that
the modern federal land planning laws have preempted "the
extension of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims
in national forest lands." Future courts may have to consider
the question, however, if they are faced with state regulations
that they choose not to characterize as "environmental" in their
orientation.
There is considerable room to challenge the assumption the
Court made. The federal land planning statutes do, as the Court
points out, call more for consultation and cooperation between
state and federal governments than for independent application of
state zoning plans. For example, the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), the most full-blown version of
modern congressional balancing of state and federal interests in
land use planning for the federal lands, stops short of giving
non-federal governments a land use planning-based veto over
activities on federal lands managed by the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM). Instead, the Secretary of the Interior is
obliged to make federal land use plans "consistent with State
and local plans to the maximum extent he finds consistent with
Federal law and the purposes of this Act." Dissenting Justice
Scalia found this language controlling, arguing that it would be
"superfluous ... if the States were meant to have independent
land use authority over.federal lands."
But this provision does not necessarily oust the states from
an independent role, for its phrasing sustains the interpretation
that Congress merely wanted the Secretary of the Interior to make
the initial judgment about whether state and local plans are
preempted. These nonfederal governments still retain the right
to seek judicial review of a secretarial decision preempting the
applicability of their plans, to test whether preemption is
"consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act."
Under this view, Congress did not establish an automatic preemp
tion of state and local land use planning authority in FLPMA.
Rather, it left the matter up to the more traditional case-by-
case review, by the agency initially, and then by the courts.
5. May subdivisions of state government apply their
environmental regulatory permit schemes on federal lands?
This question suggests one way to distinguish the Ventura
decision from Granite Rock, for the former involved a county
while the latter involved the state. Once again Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion was characterized by silence, one
footnote merely pointing out that no local permit requirement is
involved.
To lay fundamental preemptive emphasis on the character of
the nonfederal government involved would seem to fly in the face
of the long-established maxim that for nearly all federal
constitutional purposes, including application of the Supremacy
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Clause, local governments are regarded merely as units of state
government. Local governments derive their power from the
states, and are, within state constitutional limitations,
dependent upon state delegations of power. While Congress can
draw distinctions between local and state government if it
chooses, it does not appear to have done so very often in the
context of federal lands.
Nevertheless, there is a risk if the states and local
governments push this idea too vigorously. It is probably
natural to expect that the Forest Service, the BLM, and the
Congress will be more willing to allow state regulation on
federal lands than to tolerate regulation by every county,
village, or special governmental district. At some point in this
spiral downward through governmental layers, these agencies and
Congress might feel compelled to intervene and aggressively
invoke a national interest in how these lands are managed. And if
that happens, there is a risk that, from the states' perspective,
the baby (state regulation) might be thrown out with the bath
water (local regulation). Some suggestions for sidestepping that
and other pitfalls are set out in the conclusion below.
6. To what extent can the federal agencies change the balance of
power created by the Granite Rock decision?
Finding no evidence that the agency had intended to preempt
state law, Justice O'Connor's opinion rather curtly dismissed the
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miner's argument that the Forest Service's regulations, designed
to protect the use of the surface from hardrock mining operations
like Granite Rock's, had themselves preempted the state permit
requirement. The question remains whether the agency could, by
amending its regulations, expressly preempt application of state
permit requirements.
Although the Forest Service did not adopt its surface
management regulations until 1974, the agency had been granted
regulatory authority by Congress 77 years earlier, in the 1897
Organic Act for national forest management. This act delegated
legislative power to the agency to make "rules and regulations"
to "regulate [the] occupancy and use" of the forests. While the
delegation was practically uncabined — so much so that it took
two rounds of decision in the Supreme Court to uphold it against
a challenge, brought by grazing interests, that it was uncon
stitutionally overbroad — other parts of this same act reveal an
intent that the states retain a significant measure of police
power over activities on federal lands. Specifically, Congress
provided that state jurisdiction should "not be affected or
changed by reason of [the] existence" of the national forests.
Thus it remains unclear whether Congress intended to grant the
Forest Service the authority to preempt state law.
Analysis of the statutory authority of the other principal
federal land management agency, the Bureau of Land Management in
the Department of the . Interior, leads to the same inconclusive
conclusion. Exercising authority g.iv.en it by a number of
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statutes, including the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
and the Mining Law itself, BLM has promulgated its own generally
parallel (but not identical) regulations to protect surface
uses on BLM lands from Mining Law activities. Yet these statutes
do not unequivocally delegate power to the federal agency to
preempt state law; to the contrary, they fairly bristle with
features designed to enhance rather than diminish the role of the
states in federal land management.
Although one cannot say with assurance whether the federal
agencies have the power, without further action by Congress, to
reverse Granite Rock's holding that California's permit require
ment applies, the question will arise only if a federal agency
determined to force the issue. There is ample reason to doubt
whether the federal agencies have the political will even
to attempt preemption. It would take eyebrow-raising action by
any Administration — especially the current one, whose leader is
an aggressive proponent of reinvigorated federalism -- to
attempt to throw the states off the territory they have won in
the hard-fought battle of Granite Rock.
7. How far does Granite Rock apply outside the mining law
context?
Focusing on the specific statutory framework before it,
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion cites almost no cases, draws
on no other statutes or regulatory areas for guidance by analogy,
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and pays little attention to the rich history of state-federal
relations in land management. Yet one cannot conclude that the
decision has no implications outside the framework of the Mining
Law, for the majority does not really tie its analysis to the
Mining Law at all, except to the limited extent it asks whether
the Forest Service's surface management regulations have preempt
ed state regulation. Instead, the majority asks whether the
state regulation is land use or environmental in essential
character. And that, significantly, is an issue that applies
across practically the entire spectrum of possible uses of
federal land.
Perhaps the most important feature of this decision, indeed,
is the majority's firm rejection of dissenting Justice Powell's
argument that preemption generally ought to be found more readily
on federal land than in other contexts. Powell apparently views
preemption issues involving federal property much like the Court
has tended to view them in the foreign affairs context -- as
starting with the idea that the states must meet a heavy burden
of justifying the legitimacy of their regulatory interest in
light of a rather overwhelming constitutional commitment to
federal supremacy. His citation to Hines v. Davidowitz makes
clear that, for himself and Justice Stevens, (but not, apparent
ly, for Justices Scalia and White, dissenting separately)
the property clause of the constitution is akin to the war and
defense powers, "imperatively . . . demand[ing] broad national
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authority [where a]ny state power that may exist is restricted to
the narrowest of limits."
The majority brushes off this suggestion without elaborate
comment, rejecting any thought that "traditional pre-emption
analysis is inapt in this context." Thus the property clause
is not, for at least five and possibly seven Justices currently
on the Court, a domestic counterpart of the foreign affairs
power. By this feature alone, Granite Rock goes a substantial
way toward reviving the states as genuine partners in the process
of regulating activities on federal land.
Nevertheless, preemption analysis quintessentially turns on
context, and especially the statutory setting. On federal lands,
this will vary somewhat from resource to resource. As noted
earlier, here the Court assumes that the Mining Law, considered
by itself, allows room for the application of state regulatory
permitting schemes, and therefore the only question is whether
more recent and more generic federal laws like the land use
planning acts have intervened to preempt otherwise applicable
state laws. It remains to be seen whether the Court is equally
willing to make the same assumption about other substantive
federal land management statutes like the Taylor Grazing Act, the
National Forest Management Act or the Mineral Leasing Act.
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8. Will the Granite Rock decision discourage state participation
in the federal land planning processes?
At first blush, one is tempted to answer this question in
the affirmative. By upholding the state's power to require a
permit under its own law, independent of the federal regulatory
system, the Court appears to have invited the states to shun the
opportunities nearly all federal agency land and resource
planning processes afford for state and local government partici
pation. And this invitation might seem especially appealing
because these nonfederal governments have traditionally not been
especially vigorous about using the opportunities to influence
federal agency decisionmaking that federal law already provides.
In Granite Rock itself, for example, California had unaccount
ably waived its right to review, against the "consistency"
requirements of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),
the plan of operations the company had submitted to the Forest
Service.
Of course, nothing in the Granite Rock decision requires the
states or local governments to regulate, and some may not have an
interest in the matter, or a state law scheme that permits it.
Overall, in fact, the Western states' record in seeking to
regulate federally sponsored activities is decidedly spotty. So
far, for example, most states have not been very aggressive about
taking advantage of the opportunity the Supreme Court handed them
.in .California v. United States to control the operation- of
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federal reclamation water projects. The political power of the
reclamation beneficiaries in the affected states — beneficiaries
who form one side of one of the sturdiest iron triangles in
American politics — has so far been sufficient to head off most
state attempts to exert an independent voice. But even here
there are some signs of change, for a recent report commissioned
by the Western Governors1 Association recommends more vigorous
state advocacy with respect to the policies of the Bureau of
Reclamation.
The states have made considerable progress in recent years
adopting regulatory schemes to protect the environment. A
representative of the American Mining Congress recently told a
congressional committee that state environmental regulation of
hardrock mining had now become practically the norm. Only three
of fourteen western states had such schemes in 1970, while ten
have them today. Indeed, although Granite Rock involved regula
tion by the state Coastal Commission, California also adopted a
comprehensive Surface Mining and Reclamation Act in 1975 that,
the state Attorney General has opined, applies to federal lands.
This statute could well figure prominently in Granite Rock's
operation in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision.
Even given the increased presence of state regulatory
schemes, however, the state and local governments would do well
to resist the invitation to avoid participation in the federal
land planning process. For one thing, Granite Rock does not
eliminate the possibility that some state requirements may still,
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in the end, be preempted by federal law. Moreover, federal
agencies retain ultimate power to authorize particular uses of
federal lands, and thus remain in substantial control of what
actually happens on these lands. If state and local governments
want to influence these agencies directly on such questions as
whether to issue mineral leases or grazing permits, conduct
timber sales or set aside wildlife habitats, it will likely be
more effective for them to use the federal land use planning
process rather than state regulatory processes. Although their
influence over the federal agencies on these questions is
exercisable more through persuasion than through the force of
law, it is nonetheless significant, for the political power of
the states in the halls of the executive bureaucracies is usually
not substantially less than their power in the halls of Congress.
Secretaries of the Interior and the heads of most important
federal land management agencies, for example, usually come from
the Western states and have a sensitivity that approaches an
affinity for state concerns.
Another advantage of using the land use planning process is
that it tends to occur earlier. The state regulatory process
often comes into play only after a considerable investment of
time and resources by the federal agency and any private actor
involved. State and local participation in the federal land use
decisionmaking process can, by contrast, head off conflicts
before they ripen into entrenched, head-to-head confrontations.
That process offers the means, in other words, -for a comprehen-
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sive evaluation of possible federal land uses, considering all
the consequences, including environmental impacts on and off
federal lands that can be of particular concern to the states.
States can also use the opportunity to participate in the
federal planning process as a vehicle for resolving whatever
differences might exist between state and local attitudes toward
particular federal land uses. In this way, a state can convert
local policies into state ones or, if it deems it appropriate,
override local wishes with a different state policy. Either way,
the state will avoid tempting Congress or the federal agencies to
preempt purely local regulatory policies.
For their part, the federal agencies have, for many of the
same reasons, ample incentive to solicit state and local partici
pation in their planning processes, and to be solicitous of state
concerns in the plans that emerge. It is especially to their
advantage, both politically and from the standpoint of avoiding
unnecessary paperwork, to avoid being blind-sided by state
environmental regulatory requirements imposed after all the
federal regulatory hurdles for a particular project have been
cleared.
The Mining Law deserves special mention in this context.
The states should not regard Mining Law activities conducted on
federal lands as outside the federal land planning process. It
is true that the self-initiation feature of that law places it
somewhat apart from most environmentally significant activities
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that can take place on federal land, because the governments
regulatory controls are exercisable in a little different way.
But federal agencies possess broad authority to control these
activities by regulation, or even to prohibit them altogether by
means of withdrawals. Thus, as I have argued in more detail
elsewhere, governmental control over Mining Law activities is an
eminently sound subject for consideration in the federal land
planning process. As an American Mining Congress spokesman
recently put it, mining occupies a "unique, but not preferred,
position" among natural resource uses on federal lands.
For all these reasons, Granite Rock ought to lead to closer
state-federal cooperation in the management of federal lands,
with the federal land use planning process, paradoxically, as the
central vehicle. Agencies in both governments might agree to a
one-stop shopping permit process; for example, a state could
agree not to apply its permit requirements independently of the
federal process, so long as the federal government agreed to fold
the state requirements into the federal plans and permits.
Various arrangements might be made to eliminate duplication and
streamline enforcement, akin to those already reflected in a
number of memoranda of understanding the Forest Service, BLM, and
various state regulatory agencies have executed over the years.
A number of states now have "little NEPA's," statutes or
administrative processes that mimic the federal National
Environmental Policy Act, requiring careful advance consideration
of the environmental impacts and alternatives to proposed
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governmental actions that could have a significant impact on
environmental quality. In those states, joint state-federal
environmental impact statements, prepared in the context of
formulating land use plans or deciding upon site-specific
proposals, could be a useful way to promote closer cooperation
and simplify life for all concerned.
Inspection and enforcement to ensure compliance with
applicable requirements is another subject that merits special
attention. Users of federal land are often most aggravated not
by dual state-federal permitting requirements, but rather by
inconsistent or confusing exercises of inspection and enforcement
authority. Moreover, it is not very productive for states to
expend energy in their permitting processes if they are not
willing to adopt workable methods for inspection and enforce
ment. Especially here, cooperative agreements between local,
state and federal agencies, perhaps negotiated and even promul
gated through the land use planning process, can make consider
able sense for all concerned.
If the states are willing to participate in the federal land
planning process more vigorously, and the federal agencies are
willing to be more accommodating to state concerns, then Granite
Rock could be a major step toward more cooperation and less
confrontation between governments in federal land management.
Indeed, the ultimate result of the Granite Rock decision might be
for the federal agencies and the states to arrive at accommoda
tions, reached through the federal land planning process; that
21
approach the "consistency" requirement of the federal Coastal
Zone Management Act. The CZMA contains a federal floor for
regulating activities in the coastal zone, encourages and
facilitates state planning and regulation, and allows the states
to impose more stringent requirements subject to a federal
override in particular circumstances where the federal agency
demonstrates a clear national need for it. Legislation may not
be necessary to implement this kind of accommodation — indeed,
the BLM has already made begun to move toward it in its planning
regulations.
In short, both state and federal agencies have ample reason,
and it would appear sufficient authority, to accommodate each
other's concerns, and the planning process provides a ready
framework to work through that accommodation.
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